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During August it was just about impossible for anyone on planet earth (and possibly beyond) not to have known that the Beijing Olympics were being held. Offering the perfect antidote to the 2008 Olympic media-onslaught, Professor Ben-Ami Shillony, one of our regular review team, has produced a fascinating review of a new book on the Olympics that never were, the forgotten 1940 Tokyo Olympics. Sir Hugh Cortazzi, another stalwart reviewer, follows this up with a piece on Japanese diplomacy in the 1950s while Fumiko Halloran, also a member of the regular team, looks at a fascinating Japanese language book on Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's foreign policy written by political insider Isao Iijima, who was Koizumi's executive secretary. If that dazzling Troika doesn't satisfy your thirst for reviews then we still have an excellent account of the new Donald Keene book.

Sean Curtin

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We are grateful to our regular reviewers:

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**The 1940 Tokyo Games:
The Missing Olympics –
Japan, the Asian
Olympics and the
Olympic Movement**

by Sandra Collins



**Routledge, London and New
York, 2007, 198 pages.
Hard Back £65.00
ISBN-13: 978-0415373173**

Review by Ben-Ami Shillony

The 1940 Tokyo Summer Olympic Games are a non-event, because they never happened. Promoted by Japanese organizations since the early 1930s, decided on by the IOC (International Olympic Committee) in 1936, and given up by the Japanese in 1938, they were soon forgotten, overshadowed by the war with China and the Second World War. When the Tokyo Olympics, the first ones in Asia, finally took place in 1964, few remembered and few cared to mention the unpleasant circumstances under which the previous attempt to hold the games there was conceived and abandoned. Sandra Collins exhumes this fascinating story and brings it back to life. Using a variety of sources, she describes the day-to-day developments which led to the selection of Tokyo for the 1940 Olympic Games, and later to Japan's decision to relinquish

them. Although the reader knows how the story will end, the author manages to maintain suspense throughout the book.

The main contribution of this monograph is the presentation of the various backgrounds against which this affair evolved. The rise and fall of the 1940 Olympiad project is described in the contexts of the Olympic movement, the political developments in Japan at that time, the international relations in East Asia, the war with China, the press and public opinion in Japan and abroad, and the Japanese and Western personalities that played a role in this episode. There are no villains or heroes in this narration. As the story develops, we see how great ideals, as often happens, become entangled in the web of national, organizational, and personal interests, and how important decisions are made without adequate understanding and with no way of predicting their results.

As Collins shows, the Japanese were eager to host the 1940 Olympic Games for both external and internal reasons. They hoped that staging these games would establish Japan's status as a first-rate modern power, which is an Asian empire and the leader of the non-Western world. Against growing international criticism of Japan's aggression on the continent, the Olympic Games were considered to be a form of "people's diplomacy," that would generate foreign good will. The Tokyo Olympiad was to coincide with the 2,600th anniversary of the

legendary establishment of the Japanese empire by Emperor Jimmu (kigen) in 660 BC, planned for 1940. The combination of these two splendid celebrations was expected to boost nationalism, enhance the prestige of the emperor, and mobilize the Japanese masses for national causes. Thus, from the beginning, the Tokyo Olympics carried a double message: they were to advance modernization and internationalization on the one hand, but also to foster tradition and national pride on the other.

The Olympic Games were, since their inception in 1894, a symbol of universal peace, fair play and global understanding through sport, but in fact they were seen as a white man's affair that was held only in Europe and the United States. The argument that the Japanese used to promote Tokyo for the 1940 Olympics was that, only by staging the games in Japan, the most modern country of the non-Western world, would the Olympic movement become international. This was a powerful argument that appealed to many members of the Olympic organization. Therefore when the IOC voted, in July 1936, on the venue of the 1940 Olympiad, Tokyo's candidacy was supported not only by such Western countries like the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, but also by China, India, Egypt, and Iran (pp. 74-75).

Japan earned the 1940 games also by the achievements of its athletes. In the 1932 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the Japanese won 35 medals, including seven gold medals, and Japan was ranked fifth, after the United States, Italy, France, and Sweden, ahead of Great Britain, Germany, and Australia. In the 1936 Berlin Olympiad, which took place shortly after Tokyo had been chosen for the 1940 games, Japanese athletes won 44 medals, including six gold medals (p. 10). These victories and world records won Japan the praise of the whole world. Collins makes the illuminating remark that 32 years after the Japanese novelist Natsume Sōseki referred to himself in London as "small, ugly and yellow," a Japanese athlete in the 1932 Olympic Games in Los Angeles described himself as "tall, powerful and seemingly white" (p. 37).

In their efforts to promote Tokyo, the Japanese resorted to tactics that were then unprecedented. Japanese diplomats lobbied foreign governments, especially those of Italy and Great Britain, to persuade their Olympic committees to withdraw the candidacies of their cities from the race. In January 1935, the Japanese ambassador to Rome, Sugimura Yōtarō, who was also the Japan IOC member, met with Mussolini and convinced him to drop the candidacy of Rome for the 1940 Olympics, in exchange for Japan's support of Rome's candidacy for the 1944 games. This enraged the Italian National

Olympic Committee, which possessed the right to make such decisions, but the committee had to abide by the will of the Duce (pp. 60-67).

Japan also used monetary incentives to promote its case. In December 1934, the Tokyo City Assembly allocated one million yen (half a million US dollars) to subsidize the travel of athletes and officials to the Tokyo Olympiad (p. 56). The president of the IOC, the Belgian Count Henry Baillet-Latour, was invited to Tokyo, on an all-expense-paid trip, to inspect the city's sports facilities. He arrived in March 1936, shortly after the suppression of the attempted coup d'état of February 1936, but despite the troubled times he was wined and dined during the two and a half weeks that he spent in Japan, and was even received by the emperor. Baillet-Latour was greatly impressed by what he saw and heard and returned home as an enthusiastic supporter of the Tokyo games (pp. 67-70).

The IOC claimed that its decisions were based purely on sporting considerations and had nothing to do with politics, but the selection of Berlin and Tokyo as the venues of the Olympic Games in 1936 and 1940 enabled Nazi Germany, and almost enabled militarist Japan, to use these games as a propaganda tool of their authoritarian and militaristic regimes. Avery Brundage, the president of the American Olympic Committee in 1936, rejected the demands of Jewish groups in his country to boycott Hitler's Olympiad, on the grounds that "sports is above politics" (pp. 147, 149).

The choice of Tokyo, in July 1936, as the venue of the 1940 games caused a great sensation in Japan. The streets were decorated with Japanese and Olympic flags, fireworks were lit, congratulatory slogans were displayed, and commemorative stamps were issued to celebrate the occasion (p. 76). But it soon turned out that the Japanese could not make up their minds on important issues concerning the games. The first problem was the location of the Olympic Stadium. When Tokyo submitted its bid, it notified that the central stadium would be located in the Outer Gardens of the Meiji Shrine. When Baillet-Latour visited Tokyo, he was deeply impressed by the serene beauty of that site. But after Tokyo had been chosen, the Home Ministry and the Shrine Bureau objected to that plan, claiming that the boisterous stadium would disturb the sanctity of the gardens dedicated to the spirits of the Meiji Emperor and his wife. After a long debate, which dragged for two years, the government decided, contrary to the wishes of the IOC president, to construct the central stadium in the Komazawa district of the capital (pp. 112-123).

Another controversy surrounded the route of the

Olympic flame. The custom of bringing the fire from Olympia in Greece to the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games by relay, was started with the Berlin Olympics, at that time to symbolize that Nazi Germany was the successor of ancient Greece. This new tradition struck roots and has continued until today. The planners of the 1936 relay recommended that the 1940 relay, which would span 10,000 km., should be conducted by horse riders and runners and follow the ancient Silk Road. But the Japanese did not like the idea of the Central Asian route which would cross China, and suggested instead that one of their war ships carry the torch from Greece to Japan. Later, the Japanese proposed that the Olympic flame be carried by an airplane (called "kamikaze") along a South Asian route. Within Japan the fire would be carried by relay from Mt. Hyūga in Kyushu (where the legendary Ninigi-no-mikoto descended from heaven to rule Japan), through the Ise Shrines to Tokyo (pp. 124-132). Another problem was the emperor's role in the opening ceremony. According to the Olympic rules, the head of the host state officially opens the games. But the Japanese emperor at that time was considered to be too sacred to have his voice transmitted electronically by microphone, loudspeaker or radio (pp. 132-135).

Collins shows how difficult it was to transplant the Western traditions and practices of the Olympic Games into the political and cultural context of prewar Japan, and how difficult it was for the Japanese to decide how to present their "Asian" traditions and values to the Western world through the Olympic Games. Obtaining consensus on these issues in prewar Japan was almost an impossible goal, with the military, the bureaucracy, the Olympic Committee, and the public pulling in different directions.

Under these circumstances it became questionable whether the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games would ever take off. But what finally sealed their fate was the expanding war in China, which had broken out in July 1937. At first, the Japanese hoped that the hostilities would end in a short time and they would be able to stage the Olympic Games as scheduled. But as the war situation exacerbated at the expense of more and more lives and material, the prospects for the games started to look dim. The financial allocations for the Olympiad were gradually curtailed, and voices were heard that it was inappropriate to host such a festive event at a time when Japanese young men were dying on the battlefields. In March 1938, Army Minister Sugiyama Hajime declared that the Olympic Games interfered with the "successful conclusion of the China Incident". Two months later, Welfare Minister Kido Kōichi, the cabinet minister responsible for

the games, informed the Diet that the government had decided to cancel the Tokyo Olympiad (pp. 151, 161-162). Although there had been earlier calls in the United States and Britain to boycott the Tokyo Olympics, in protest at Japan's aggression in China, the cancellation of the games was made by the Japanese themselves. The IOC President Baillet-Latour insisted until the last moment that the games should be held as scheduled, explaining that he opposed the boycott of Tokyo "with the same arguments I used to fight the Jewish campaign in 1936" (p. 157).

The cancellation of the Tokyo Olympics did not bring about the cancellation of the 2,600th anniversary of the foundation of the empire. On the contrary, relieved from the need to host a multitude of Western athletes and to perform problematic Western ceremonies, the Japanese celebrated the kigen of 1940 on a grand scale in a solemn and traditional way. As part of the celebrations, Tokyo hosted the East Asian Games, in which 700 athletes from Japan, Manchukuo, occupied China, Thailand, the Philippines, and Hawaii participated. A "sacred fire," brought by relay from Kashihara Shrine (dedicated to Emperor Jimmu) in Nara Prefecture, ignited the flame at the Meiji Shrine Outer Gardens, where the central ceremony took place (pp. 179-180). Meanwhile, the IOC had chosen Helsinki to host the 1940 Olympic Games, but the Second World War, which broke out in September 1939, led to the cancellation of both the 1940 and 1944 Olympiads.

After the war, the Olympic Games were resumed, with London hosting them in 1948, Helsinki in 1952, and Melbourne in 1956. In May 1952, shortly after the end of the Allied Occupation of Japan, the governor of Tokyo submitted the candidacy of his city for the 1960 summer games. But Rome, which had competed with Japan for the 1940 Olympics in the past, won. In 1958 Tokyo hosted, with remarkable success, the third Asian Games, proving how well it was prepared to host international sporting events. In 1959, Tokyo's candidacy was submitted again for the 1964 Olympics and this time it won. The bid was supported by the IOC president, Avery Brundage, who had succeeded Baillet-Latour and who had been, like him, an enthusiastic supporter of the 1940 Tokyo games (p. 182). The 1964 Tokyo Olympiad was an astonishing success, showing the whole world how successfully Japan had modernized and democratized. The Olympic flame was carried from Athens to Kagoshima by a JAL plane, which stopped on its way in Istanbul, Beirut, Tehran, Lahore, New Delhi, Calcutta, Rangoon, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Hong Kong, and Taipei. In Kagoshima, the flame was separated into four flames which advanced to Tokyo by relay along

four routes, passing the capitals of all prefectures. The flames were reunited in front of the imperial palace into one torch, which was carried from there to light the Olympic Cauldron at the Olympic Stadium at the Meiji Shrine Outer Gardens, by Sakai Yoshinori, who was born in Hiroshima on the day that the atomic bomb was dropped. The Shōwa Emperor announced the opening of the Olympic Games into a microphone, with no objection from the conservatives (p. 184).


The second time that the Olympic Games were held in Asia was in Seoul in 1988, and the third time was in Beijing in 2008. Collins thinks that the historical precedent for the Seoul and Beijing Olympics was not the the 1964 Olympiad in Tokyo, but rather the aborted 1940 Tokyo Olympiad. She points out that like Japan in 1940, but unlike Japan in 1964, South Korea in 1988 and China in 2008 were authoritarian Asian countries which wished to strengthen their regimes and improve their international standing by demonstrating their modernity (p. 186). Collins alleges that when the mayor of Beijing, Liu Qi, announced that the 2008 Olympic Games would “promote economic and social progress... promote the exchange of the Great Chinese culture with other cultures... [and] mark a major step forward in the spread of Olympic ideals,” he was mimicking the rhetoric of the campaign to promote the 1940 Tokyo games (p. 187).

The book is well written, with charts, cartoons, and black and white photographs. Yet, it is not clear why the author, or the editor, decided to present the chapters as independent essays, with their own lists of references. As a result, there are some overlappings on the one hand and some lacunae on the other. The most important topic which I found missing was the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. The Berlin Olympiad is remembered in Japan and Korea because of the Korean athlete Sohn Kee-Chung (Son Kitei in Japanese), who won the marathon race as a member of the Japanese team. Another Korean, Nam Sung-Yong, won the bronze medal of that marathon, also as Japanese. In 1936 they were regarded as Japanese, today they are regarded as Koreans. At the opening ceremony of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Sohn Kee-Chung, at the advanced age of 76, carried the Olympic torch into the stadium, as a representative of Korean athletic achievements. This whole story is not mentioned in the book.

Another problem is the haphazard spelling of Japanese names. In transcribing Japanese names into English, one can either ignore the long vowels, as some authors have done, and not use macrons, or one can, as many scholars nowadays do, indicate the long vowels by macrons. This book

follows a strange middle way, sometimes using macrons, sometimes attaching them partially, and sometimes avoiding them altogether. Thus, Kido Kōichi and Kōno Ichirō appear throughout the book without the macrons, while Kanō Jigorō appears sometimes with macrons, sometimes without them, sometimes as Senator (?) Kano (p. 52, caption), and sometimes as Kanō Jigarō (p. 92). In addition, Niniginomikoto on p. 127 becomes Nihigi-no-mikoto on the following page, and Kido's Nikki (diary) becomes Nikko in the references on p. 176. A little more editorial attention would have avoided these mistakes and inconsistencies. But these are minor defects. The book is recommended reading to anyone interested in modern Japanese history or the history of the Olympic Games.

This review first appeared in *Reviews in History*, produced by the Institute of Historical Research, School of Advanced Study at the University of London and is reproduced with permission of the review Professor Ben-Ami Shillony of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem



Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s:

From Isolation to Integration

edited by Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, and John Weste

Routledge, 2007, 215 pages including index and notes.

Hardback £75.00

ISBN13: 978-0415372961

Review by Sir Hugh Cortazzi

The studies in this volume are a valuable contribution to knowledge of Japan's post-war diplomacy and will help students of Japanese foreign policy to understand some of the complicated negotiations which affected Japanese interests.

Perhaps because as a young diplomat I was involved on the margins of some of the events discussed I was particularly interested in Part I “Japan, Anglo-American rivalry, and indifference.” In Chapter 1 Shibayama Futoshi concludes that “the US forced the UK to accept the strategic notion that a Soviet attack on Japan was sufficient *casus belli*... In this way, the US forcefully linked the defence of Japan with that of Western Europe.”

In Chapter 2 on “Great Britain and Japanese rearmament, 1945-60” John Weste notes correctly

that "Military security was hardly the first instance in which British officials found themselves ignored by their US counterparts. The Foreign Office had earlier noticed an American reluctance to share its economic policies for Japan." (The extent to which members of the US mission in Japan were prepared to share information with members of the British mission depended to a considerable extent on personal contacts.) Later Weste asserts: "ten years after allied victory and three years after the end of the occupation, the FO experts blatantly still held little faith in the seaworthiness of Japanese democracy." Nor were they convinced that Japan would long adhere to the pacifist principles underlined by Article 9 of the constitution. (Former members of the Japan Consular service with whom I served in the British mission were understandably sceptical, in the light of their experience of pre-war Japan, about the intentions of pre-war politicians, such as Kishi Nobusuke, who had leading roles in the Japan of the 1950s.)

Chapter 3 by Tomaru Junko on "Japan in British Regional Policy towards South-East Asia, 1945-1960" asserts that Malcolm MacDonald and his successors as Commissioner General for the United Kingdom "continued to play an important role in shaping British policies towards South-East Asia through their correspondence with the Foreign and the Colonial Offices, and through chairing the annual conferences of the British Heads of Mission under their jurisdiction." As a very junior diplomat it fell to me to act as secretary of the conference chaired by Malcolm MacDonald held at Bukit Serene in December 1950. I do not think that any of the colonial governors or, for that matter, British ambassadors present felt that they were under MacDonald's "jurisdiction." The governors, in particular, jealously guarded their autonomy and prerogatives and would never have accepted any attempt by MacDonald to dictate policy. Hong Kong was not, of course, part of South-East Asia and the governor of the colony, Sir Guy Grantham, hardly disguised his contempt for the whole affair. Tomaru Junko asserts that MacDonald's later appointment as British High Commissioner to India was due to his being regarded as too "Asian-minded" and "insufficiently active in directing a co-ordinated anti-communist front and conveying London's views to the elite." If this was the view in parts of Whitehall it was not in my view fair to MacDonald. MacDonald, a former politician and son of Ramsay MacDonald, the Labour Prime Minister, was informal in dress and manner. He got on well with Asians and preferred to mix with them rather than with the colonial elite in Singapore. I suspect that this had upset some of the stuffy senior colonial servants. MacDonald may also have ruffled feathers in Whitehall by his tendency to send lengthy secret


and personal messages to Ministers and to bypass the normal channels. Rob Scott, his successor, who had been imprisoned in Changi jail during the war and had suffered greatly as a result, had been the under-secretary in charge of Asian Affairs in the Foreign office. He was able and intelligent. He was no "push-over" but was readier than MacDonald to stick to the accepted channels. Working in the Commissioner General's office was a frustrating experience as our work consisted essentially of coordinating and liaising between the British missions and colonial governments in the area plus the regional information office on the one hand and the three service headquarters in Phoenix Park, Singapore, where we also had our offices. In the 1950s the Commissioner General had a useful role but his influence should not be exaggerated. The British ambassador to Japan was invited to the regular conferences in Singapore but Japan was not seen as central to British policies in South East Asia. As Tomaru Junko points out: "despite the closer contacts and co-operation between Britain and Japan in Asia in the latter half of the 1950s, Britain still distrusted Japanese intentions."

Part II covers "Japan's re-emergence in regional and international organizations" and contains interesting and informative studies by Kweku Ampiah on "Japan at the Bandung Conference," Oba Mie on "Japan's entry into ECAFE" and Kurusu Kaoru on "Japan's struggle for UN membership in 1955."

Part III is entitled "Japanese and US domestic constraints on Foreign Policy." The first study by John Swenson-Wright is on "The Lucky-Dragon Incident of 1954: A failure of crisis management?" Swenson-Wright notes correctly that the incident revealed "an interesting ambivalence in Japan's attitude to nuclear issues. Japan's nuclear allergy was highly selective." His account of the revelations made by the Soviet defector Rastvorov is a valuable summary of an important episode. He notes that the Americans were increasingly frustrated by inaccurate Japanese press reporting about the incident. He quotes Bill Leonhart, then Minister in the US Embassy who was one of the ablest members of the state department (who would never have been accused of hiding his light under a bushel). Unfortunately, as Swenson-Wright points out, there were "very real failings" on the part of the US in handling the Lucky Dragon Incident at least initially. (I noted that Swenson-Wright has dug out of the archives a minute which I wrote in October 1954 as a junior officer in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. Young diplomats beware! Their confidential animadversions may appear in print one day!).

One of the other two studies in this part is that

by Robert Eldridge on “the Revision of the US-Japan security treaty and Okinawa” which I found enlightening. The other by Caroline Rose “Breaking the deadlock: Japan’s informal diplomacy with the People’s Republic of China in 1958-9” contained much which I did not know (I was at that time working in Bonn).



**Jitsuroku Koizumi Gaiko
(Records of Koizumi
Diplomacy)**

by Isao Iijima

**Nihon Keizai Shimbun
Shuppansha, 2007,
343 pages.**

Hardback ¥ 1,890

ISBN -13: 978-4532352714

Review by Fumiko Halloran

Iijima Isao, who was Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō’s executive secretary, has come out with a new book in which he gives a full-fledged and intriguing account of the former prime minister’s diplomacy, focusing on records of his trips and of visits to Japan by prominent leaders from around the world. It follows the author’s earlier book, the subject of an earlier review in Issue 11 (Vol. 2 No. 5 October 2008 pp.2-3), about Koizumi’s domestic reforms.

By reading this record, perhaps the most striking lesson one learns is that a prime minister is required to have physical stamina to keep going with little sleep and a strong stomach to eat unfamiliar food presented by the hosts. In contrast to Koizumi’s physical resilience, his successor, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō had to resign after only one year mainly because of serious health problems that were aggravated by strenuous overseas trips.

In 2001, for instance, Koizumi was scheduled to fly to Beijing early in the morning of 8th October. Late at night on the 7th, Koizumi was informed that American bombing in Afghanistan had begun. At 2am on 8th, he convened an emergency cabinet meeting. At 3am, he held an emergency press conference. At 8 am, he boarded the plane for Beijing. He visited the Marco Polo Bridge and an anti-Japan war museum and expressed his apologies and condolences to the victims of the war between China and Japan. Then, he attended a working luncheon with Prime Minister Zhu Rongji that was followed by another meeting with Chairman Jiang Zemin. Late in the afternoon, Koizumi’s group flew back to Tokyo, arriving at 9pm. At 10 pm, he convened another emergency cabinet

gathering and then an anti-terrorist meeting. There is no record of how long these meetings lasted, but assuming he went to bed around midnight, for more than 24 hours, he kept a busy schedule without much sleep.

During his term in office from April 2001 to October 2006, Koizumi made 51 trips abroad, visiting 49 countries, some several times. He visited the United States 8 times, South Korea 7 times, Indonesia 4 times, China 3 times, Russia 4 times, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam twice each. Moreover, he was the first Japanese prime minister to visit Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia. His travels extended to Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, as well as India and Pakistan. In Africa, he went to South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia, and in the Americas, travelled to Brazil, Chile and Mexico. In addition, he talked over the phone with foreign leaders more than 90 times. He met with heads of state and other leaders who visited Japan on more than 200 occasions. His foreign trips included international conferences such as the G8 summit talks five times, ASEAN and APEC conferences, and the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

The book is a straight record of each trip with little political analysis but Iijima emphasizes the basic approach of Koizumi’s diplomacy. His book shows that, despite advanced technology in communications, meetings between political leaders are useful in improving bilateral and multilateral relations. This diplomacy, which is called “Shunō Gaikō” (top leaders’ diplomacy), in contrast to “Gaimushō Gaikō” (Foreign Ministry diplomacy), requires leaders of strong will and negotiation skills. Koizumi certainly made strong impressions on these accounts.

As for criticism that he caused strained relations with China and South Korea, Iijima quotes Koizumi as saying, “I believe later generations would give positive evaluation as they would come to understand the circumstances.”

Iijima asserts that the Foreign Ministry’s diplomacy focuses on long-term relations based on the expertise of government officials and those with an institutional memory of the history of relations with other countries.

In the Shunō Gaikō, direct encounters with top leaders are necessary because they can solve problems at political level, sometimes with dramatic results. A case in point was Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, North Korea. Koizumi confronted the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Il, who conceded that his country was responsible for kidnapping Japanese citizens. That was in September, 2002. After his second visit to Pyongyang, in May 2004,

Koizumi brought back five Japanese victims of kidnapping. But he failed to persuade Robert Jenkins, the American husband of Hitomi Soga, and their two daughters to join the group. Later, they were reunited with Soga in Indonesia, then came to Japan. Since Japan and North Korea have no diplomatic relations, Iijima says finding North Korea's intentions prior to the meetings was difficult. Japan had to negotiate with the US military on the treatment of Jenkins, who had defected to North Korea from South Korea. Although the kidnapping issue dominated Japanese press coverage and public opinion, Iijima points out that the two leaders discussed at length issues of nuclear arms, missiles, and spy boats.

The sequence of Koizumi's foreign visits reveals his priorities in foreign policy. In June 2001, soon after he became prime minister, Koizumi visited the United States, United Kingdom and France in one trip. Then he attended his first G8 summit in Italy. He again came to the United States immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, visiting the sites and assuring President Bush of Japan's cooperation in combating terrorism. After consolidating close relations with Western partners, he visited China and South Korea in two separate trips in one month in attempts to improve bilateral relations that had been chilled with disagreements over Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese history textbooks, and Japan's war responsibility. Then he attended multilateral talks of APEC in Shanghai and ASEAN Plus 3 meeting in Brunei. His last trip in his first year was to Belgium to attend the tenth annual Japan-European Union meeting where he met with senior EU leaders.

According to Iijima, Koizumi's strategy with Asian and African nations was to treat them on an equal footing, respecting their national pride regardless of the size and power of those nations. Koizumi's personality apparently played a major role as various episodes in the book illustrate how other leaders sought him out in international conferences, how he was often the top story in the press of host countries and how his love of music and open mind charmed dignitaries and children alike.

Iijima says that despite Koizumi's seven visits to South Korea, bilateral relations were strained after President Roh Moo-hyun was elected. The meeting at the inauguration of the new president went well. By June 2005, however, when Koizumi made his sixth visit to Seoul, disputes over Takeshima (Dokdo in Korean and also known as the Liancourt Rocks in English) chilled relations. Despite an agreement that they would take turns visiting each other's country, Roh never came to Japan for an official visit. Koizumi and Roh did have a brief meeting in Ibusuki, a hot spa in Kagoshima, in an informal

setting.

With China, Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were a sore point and Japan's relations with China were strained during his tenure. (During the visit of China's President Hu Jintao to Japan in May 2008, Koizumi declined to attend meetings with Hu, including a breakfast meeting with former prime ministers. Koizumi reportedly said he did not wish to spoil the occasion for Hu with whom he had heated arguments about the Yasukuni Shrine issue.)


Another failure was Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In spite of Koizumi's appeal in person to foreign leaders and assurances from many that they would support Japan, Japan could not overcome opposition from China and South Korea.

Koizumi's talks with foreign leaders covered a wide range of political, economic, and security issues; in most of his speeches, he emphasized Japan's willingness to work with other nations in expanding economic and trade partnerships, challenging global and social issues such as hunger and AIDs, and stimulating human and cultural exchanges. He made it clear that Japan joined the international effort to combat terrorism and sided with the US by sending National Self-Defense Forces on missions to Iraq and the Indian Ocean.

Koizumi kept up a swift pace for five years and five months, navigating domestic reforms, elections, and diplomacy, often giving instructions on legislative and political matters on the phone from his plane. His last overseas trip as prime minister was in September 2006 to Helsinki, Finland, for an official visit and to attend an ASEM6 (Asia-Europe Meeting). At a press conference, Koizumi expressed his satisfaction that the meeting had been productive, covering a wide range of topics including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, AIDs, North Korea, the Middle East, the environment, and economic development.

The book has a complete list of Koizumi's overseas trips, his meetings with foreign leaders in Japan, and the names of officials who, as special assistants to the prime minister, were involved in the preparation and execution of Shunō Gaikō.

A different version of this review first appeared on the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Japan-US Discussion Forum and is reproduced with permission.



Chronicles of My Life, An American in the Heart of Japan

by Donald Keene

Columbia University Press, New York, 2008, 208 pages, including photographs and list of names of Japanese mentioned in the text.

**Hardback £16.50
ISBN 13: 978-0231144407**

Review by Sir Hugh Cortazzi

Donald Keene is the most eminent foreign scholar of Japan. He has written more than thirty books about Japan including many translations of Japanese works from medieval to modern times and an illuminating history of Japanese literature.

His book "On Familiar Terms, a Journey across Cultures" which was published by Kodansha International in 1994 included some account of his life and his immersion in Japanese history and culture. The present volume is more the personal story of his life and friendships.

He was a lonely child, but was introduced to Europe as a boy when he accompanied his father in 1931 visiting Paris, Vienna and Berlin. One day in 1940 he came across in a second hand bookshop in New York a copy of Arthur Waley's "Tale of Genji" which he bought for 40 cents. He found the translation 'magical' as so many others since have done. After the war when he was teaching at Cambridge University he enjoyed meeting Waley in London. He began to study Japanese before he joined the US Navy where he was trained at the US Navy's Japanese Language School.

One of his war-time assignments with Otis Carey took him to Attu, a cold inhospitable island in the Aleutians where he took part in the American landings. There were only twenty-nine Japanese prisoners. Later he took part in the landing on Okinawa, by good fortune escaping death from a failed kamikaze attack. After the war he was sent to China rather than to Japan, although he managed a week's quick visit to occupied Japan.

On being demobilised he resumed his studies of Japanese at Columbia University and later at Harvard where he was disappointed by Professor Elisséeff's attitude towards Japanese scholars. From there he managed to win a fellowship to go to England. He thought it would be a mistake to study Japanese in England where there were at that time few opportunities for Japanese studies. Instead he thought of taking up Arabic and Persian, but was dissuaded from pursuing this idea. Although he had an MA from Columbia he was regarded by Cambridge University as an undergraduate.

He decided to spend his first Christmas in Italy. On his way there his only copy of his draft doctoral thesis was stolen. Devastated by this experience he was fortunately helped by kind English friends. He set about rewriting his thesis and came in touch with Eric Ceadel who had been appointed senior lecturer in Japanese at the University. Ceadel asked him to teach Japanese conversation. 'At the time, students at Cambridge were introduced to the language by reading the preface to the tenth-century anthology of poetry "Kokinshu" in the original... My conversation classes were most peculiar. The students tended to use tenth-century vocabulary even when relating contemporary events.' Donald went on to join the staff at Cambridge and worked on his book "The Japanese Discovery of Europe."

In London he was able to enjoy concerts and operas. He recalled these London performances "with particular affection and with gratitude" that he "happened to be present during an extraordinary revival of music." He records that "On the whole I was happy during the five years I lived in England," but he wanted to get to Japan.

He managed to win a fellowship which enabled him to travel to Japan. He reached Tokyo in August 1953 and went straight to Kyoto. He found Kyoto "a wonderful city" and immersed himself in Japanese culture. "My greatest pleasure at this time," he writes, "was my kyogen (comic drama) lessons".

Cambridge University would not extend his leave of absence but he was allowed to do so by Columbia University which offered him a post. From then on he has commuted each year between New York and Japan.

In Japan he made many friends in the literary and publishing world including Tanizaki Junichirō, Kawabata Yasunari and Mishima Yukio, but while he worked on modern novels he never flagged in his study of Japanese classical literature.

All foreign students of Japanese culture owe a great debt to Donald Keene's scholarship and must admire his sensitive writing about Japan, its literature and its history. They will enjoy this memoir with its charming little colour illustration. Donald's humility and humour shine through.

