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“Koizumi no Shori, Media no Haiboku” (Victory for Koizumi, Defeat for the Media)

“Koizumi no Shori, Media no Haiboku” (Victory for Koizumi, Defeat for the Media)

Soshisha, November 2006, 286 pages, 1500 yen

Review by Fumiko Halloran

This is a rare book written by a journalist who criticizes the faults not only of himself but the press in general in its reporting on the Koizumi government. He is courageous in listing his original articles and examining them against what actually happened, adding background around specific topics he covered. He found that most of his reporting on Prime Minster Koizumi either was not accurate or grossly misinterpreted the reality of PM Koizumi’s domestic and foreign policy.

Perhaps the most serious weakness in Mr. Uesugi’s reporting was that he did not cover domestic policy in detail, particularly of the structural reforms on which PM Koizumi risked his political life. Mr. Uesugi admits that he did not extensively report on that because he did not fully understand the details of economic and financial policies at the time. Instead, he focused on the political struggles that surrounded the structural reforms. Being a freelance reporter, perhaps he could not cover all the topics but, as he admits, he and many journalists were swept up in covering PM Koizumi’s fights with his own party, his unexpected choices of key cabinet ministers, and political drama such as firing of Ms. Makiko Tanaka as foreign minister. The Koizumi regime was never dull but presented dramatic characters and stories and was therefore nicknamed “The Koizumi Theatre.”

Foreign press reported extensively on PM Koizumi’s foreign policy but stories on his domestic reforms and economic, fiscal, and financial problems drew only scant attention, except for publications such as the Economist magazine. (I thank the NBR staff for doing research on this point).

Mr. Uesugi’s portrait of PM Koizumi when he was in office is rather harsh, calling him an ultimate narcissist who focused only on his own ideas, ruthlessly cut even close political allies if necessary, and pursued his goals relentlessly. The author, perhaps correctly, points out that PM Koizumi’s declaration of a general election when the Upper House defeated his bill for privatizing the postal savings and insurance system damaged the basic rules of the parliamentary system. Indeed, there was a question why the prime minister could declare a general election when the Lower House had passed the legislation. But it was within his jurisdiction. The only problem the press had was that most political reporters did not believe PM Koizumi would pull such a stunt as they were mired in the traditional political games. When PM Koizumi declared an election, the press was thrown into confusion and was forced to follow the political frenzy rather than remain in control of the reporting. PM Koizumi’s LDP had a landslide victory. Mr. Uesugi saw the election in the summer of 2005 as an epitaph of defeat for the press.

Mr. Uesugi concludes that journalists, particularly political editors and reporters, did not understand that PM Koizumi and his team had succeeded in breaking down the traditional relationship between the government and the press. Traditionally, the Chief Cabinet Secretary made government announcements at press conferences. Political reporters from major news organizations who belonged to the Cabinet press club were fed materials and briefed by ministries. The reporters competed with each other on personal and direct access to the party leaders, trying to get latest information about what was going on within the party and the cabinet. By this method, they speculated about forthcoming cabinet and party appointments. The shortcoming of this practice was that political reporters were often too close to those in power and were accustomed to being briefed by the ruling party and ministries rather than investigating the issues on their own.

The first action the Koizumi team took on the press relations, however, was to change the system of reporting. Traditionally, print press reporters monopolized the questioning of the prime minister who would come back from the parliament or various functions to his official residence. This was called “burasagari shuzai” (hanging on to the source) as the PM would answer questions while walking into the residence. TV crews were not allowed. The Koizumi team changed it to limit the burasagari arrangement for the print press reporters during the day only and focused on TV reporting in the evening. Consequently, PM Koizumi’s remarks and image were beamed directly into millions of households. This in turn generated greater interest in the so-called “TV wide shows” during which contemporary political topics were debated. The effort to bypass the close relationship among bureaucrats, politicians, and political reporters worked and reporters from the Cabinet press club began to lose useful sources. An exciting topic was cabinet appointments but, since PM Koizumi never consulted anyone, even his staff, on these appointments, the reporters were left in the dark until the moment of the announcement. So were the LDP leaders.

Mr. Uesugi suggests that Japanese newspapers should identify their writers, should investigate taboo subjects more vigorously, and stop self-censorship through the press club system. He is particularly critical of TV coverage, although he himself became a news reporter for a television station last year. Directly involved in TV programming, he asserts he realizes now how TV coverage of the Koizumi government was often distorted because they were sensitive to the reaction of viewers. For example, when Ms. Makiko Tanaka was popular among the public, no TV stations dared to report on her incompetence in running the ministry and her bizarre behavior and remarks that almost paralyzed Japan’s foreign policy. When PM Koizumi finally fired her, his approval rate dropped overnight by 20 points.

Mr. Uesugi was born in 1968. After graduating from college, he worked for a TV station, then became an aide to a member of the House of Representatives. After that, he was hired as a reporter in The New York Times Tokyo bureau and later began to work as a freelance reporter. Since 2006, he has been a reporter for Asahi Television.

This book is worth reading because of the author’s honesty in examining the flaws of Japanese press. His central interest is to pursue a healthy tension between the government and the media. As a freelance reporter during the Koizumi years, he certainly seemed to have pursued that objective, however flawed. As a member of a television station that can be saddled with viewer ratings, sponsors, government regulations, and tension between management and union, this reviewer wonders how far Mr. Uesugi can go toward that goal. Mr. Uesugi’s candid book seemed to attract attention of Japanese readers, as the book went into a fourth printing in one month after its publication and remains a best seller.

A different version of this review first appeared on the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Japan-U.S. Discussion Forum and is reproduced with permission of the author. The original review can be found here