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Okamoto Yukio: Genba Shugi o Tsuranuita Gaikokan

Okamoto Yukio: Genba Shugi o Tsuranuita Gaikokan

Asahi Shimbun Publishing, 2008, 347 pages, ISBN-13: 978-4022504791, 2000 yen

Review by Fumiko Halloran

Yukio Okamoto quit the foreign ministry when he was director (kacho) of the first department on North America, a position coveted by ambitious officials. As he was only 45 years old, this shocked not only his colleagues but his superiors who tried to keep him. His departure was reported by major newspapers, which was rare for an individual resignation in government.

In this book, which is based on a series of interviews, Okamoto explains his state of mind. Shortly after the end of the Gulf War in 1991, he was afraid of becoming a bureaucrat whose instinct would be caution, not making mistakes, and not risking his career on challenging causes. He denies having any problems with the ministry, asserting that he maintained contact with his former colleagues after leaving.

Okamoto then established Okamoto & Associates in Tokyo, a small think tank. It began to attract clients and soon Seirouku Kajimoto, chief cabinet secretary of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, asked Okamoto for help after a girl was raped by American soldiers in Okinawa in 1996. Okamoto established a special government task force to help Okinawan communities that had various issues with U.S. bases. Since then, Okamoto has often been involved in Japan’s diplomacy while remaining a private citizen. Earlier, in the foreign ministry, he had been involved in U.S.-Japan security issues during the Cold War and the Gulf War. As a private citizen, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi appointed Okamoto as a counselor to the cabinet to deal with the post 9-11 crisis and to help shape Japan’s response to the Iraq war.
This book would be useful to researchers on Japan’s foreign policy, for two reasons. The first is Okamoto’s detailed description of what Japan did in several international crises. For example, he discloses hitherto unknown logistical contributions by Japan in the Gulf War when the international community had criticized Japan for inaction. Okamoto was in charge of compiling a list of supplies for the international coalition forces, coordinating with several ministries to secure the supplies and arranging for transporting them to Iraq. In addition to giving 1.5 trillion yen in financial assistance, Japan donated 80 billion yen worth of materials including 800 Toyota Land Cruisers and Mitsubishi Pajero, trucks, forklifts, seawater purifying facilities, computers and construction materials.

General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the Coalition Forces in the Middle East, praised Japan’s effort in his memoir, although bashing of Japan with newspaper headlines such as “Too late, too little” continued. Okamoto regrets that Japan lost in the communications war because of the reluctance of the Japanese government to inform the US government and public about its contributions. The Japanese government was reluctant because it was concerned about the political backlash in Japan from those who opposed Japanese involvement in the war. Okamoto discovered Washington was little aware of the scope of Japanese involvement. He points out, however, that the fundamental problem was the lack of leadership by Japanese government headed by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, who failed to disclose Japan’s position, policy, and action.

Secondly, Okamoto explains the working of the Japanese bureaucracy in shaping foreign policy. He cites turf battles, the influence of political issues on foreign policy, and how individuals can guide foreign policy to certain goals.

Japan’s role in the U.S.-Soviet INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) negotiation was little known until Okamoto explained it in this book. The negotiation started in 1981 after the Soviets deployed SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe. Reflecting close relations between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, the US dispatched a special envoy to brief the Japanese government each time the US-Soviet negotiations proceeded to the next level. In 1986, Nakasone received a personal letter from Reagan saying the US planned to propose that Russia withdraw all SS-20s from west of the Ural Mountains and reduce by 50% of SS-20s aimed at Asia. In exchange, the U.S. would withdraw GLCMs (Ground Launched Cruise Missiles) and Pershing II missiles from West Germany. The next day, a special envoy from the president flew to Tokyo to brief the foreign ministry.

Japanese officials saw potential problems for Japan; 177 SS-20s positioned east of the Ural Mountains aimed at Asia had been left out of the proposal. Thus, while the proposal would ease the worries of NATO, the SS-20s aimed at Asia would trigger discord in U.S.-Japan relations, generate unease in the Japanese public, and might breed distrust of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Four officials at the foreign ministry mapped Japan’s effort to make sure that Soviet intermediate nuclear missiles aimed at Asia would be either withdrawn or neutralized; Yukio Sato, director of the Ministry Secretariat (later ambassador to the United Nations), Ryozo Kato, director of the treaty bureau (later to be ambassador to US), Yuji Miyamoto, director of the disarmament bureau (later ambassador to China), and Okamoto himself, director of US-Japan security treaty. Their strategy was to respond to the US proposal immediately, to argue with the U.S. not from the standpoint of US-Japan relations but from the potential conflict in a debate on the nuclear balance in Asia. Such tensions would backfire against the U.S. in the Pacific security strategy. Thus, they wanted not just to oppose the proposal but to suggest an alternative.

Checking all Soviet missile bases, the four concluded that it would be best if the SS-20s aimed at Asia were to be gathered at a Soviet base in Barnaul, in south-western Siberia, which was equidistant between European borders and the Sea of Okhotsk. This equidistance would neutralize the political effect of the SS-20s by making it ambiguous whether they were aimed at Europe or Asia. This proposal was included in the draft of Nakasone’s personal reply to Reagan. Okamoto flew to Washington and Miyamoto flew to Europe to deliver Japan’s proposal. Japan’s proposal was well received and presented as a Defense Department proposal to the White House. In 1987, Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, agreed that the Soviets would withdraw all SS-20s from the European and Asian front, which was more than Japan had hoped. Okamoto considers the success of the INF negotiation and Japan’s contribution to have been the result of the trust between Reagan and Nakasone, which trickled down to personnel on both sides. The absence of trade disputes that could complicate the picture and a quick response by the Japanese foreign ministry, which cut across bureaucratic obstacles, were also responsible.

Okamoto talks passionately about his involvement in the issue of Okinawa and U.S. bases. In 1996, he was appointed special assistant to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto on Okinawa issues. Until he left that position in 1998, he visited Okinawa fifty-five times, building networks with Okinawan leaders, discussing US military bases, and promoting the local economy. He proposed holding the G8 summit meeting in Okinawa; it took place in 2000, hosted by Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori.

Okamoto’s views on Americans are complicated; while he values close U.S.-Japan relations as the foundation of Japan’s security, he doesn’t always agree with the US government. One notable example is his criticism of the Bush administration for going to war in Iraq, a view published in a Japanese newspaper. Once the U.S. launched the war effort, however, Okamoto believed in fully cooperating with the US. He feared a backlash against Japan, as happened in the Gulf War. One month before the war began in March, 2003, Okamoto was in Washington discussing Japan’s role in the war. Before that, he told Prime Minister Koizumi that American forces would capture Baghdad but the real problem would be guerrilla war and terrorist attacks that would mire America in a muddy swamp. Nonetheless, Koizumi issued a strong statement supporting the war effort. Within a couple of weeks, Koizumi appointed Okamoto as a special assistant and he became engaged in post-war reconstruction in Iraq.

Okamoto frankly talks about opposition to his visible role without an official position. As a former government official, Okamoto knows how to navigate within the bureaucracy. Even so, he was often frustrated by turf-conscious former colleagues, by legal and administrative obstacles, and conflicting interests in government and private sectors. He criticizes the insularity of Japan’s political leaders and bureaucrats, arguing that the status quo means backpedalling in a rapidly changing global community. Looking at world history, he asserts that many nations have dominated the international scene for a short time and then disappeared. Japan’s influence is clearly declining, he says, and we may be witnessing the beginning of the nation’s fall.