Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain, From the First Alliance to Post -9/11

Edited by Alessio Patalano
Global Oriental, Leiden and Boston, 2012 
255 pages including index 
ISBN 978-1-906876-27-2

Review by Sir Hugh Cortazzi

This book arises from a conference held in London in 2009 organized by the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London and the Japanese Embassy. ‘This project [readers are told] represents the summation of the intellectual contributions of leading scholars in the field of British and Japanese military history and strategy.’  Part one headed Strategic partnership and military rivalry across the oceans covers the years between the re-opening of Japan in the nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War in 1945.  Part two deals with Strategic priorities from the cold war to Iraq. Part three looks at Maritime strategy in an interdependent world.

The editor in his introduction says that ‘In reviewing the Japanese and British experiences, the book seeks to identify areas of common security and operational interest that could help develop stronger military ties and reduce the impact of the limitations of national resources.’ These areas are unfortunately not clearly indicated.

As is inevitable in a multi-authored work the approaches of the various contributors vary. The scope of the book is wide and the themes do not lend themselves to clear-cut conclusions. A good deal is made of the fact that both Britain and Japan are ‘island nations’ with important trading relations, but the differences between the two nations both in geographical and historical contexts are significant.

The facts covered in the first historical section will be familiar to those who have studied the history of relations between Britain and Japan up to the end of the war. The British exercise of naval power in the Far East in the 1850s and 1860s was an object lesson for Japan and provided the spur for the Japanese Navy to model itself on the Royal Navy. The balance of power shifted in the twentieth century and the British came to see Japan as a rival rather than as a friend. Britain was declining and Japan rising. The fall of Singapore in 1942 marked the nadir of British power in the Far East.

Part two begins with a discussion of Japan’s post-war defence policy.  The emphasis from the start was on the defence of the Japanese archipelago, but following the fall of communist regimes in Europe Japan was forced to turn its attention to participation in international peace activities.  The development of Japanese policy was slow and tortuous.  Japan faced constitutional and legal issues as well as deep-seated pacifist attitudes at home which inhibited more effective actions. The Japanese response to the first Iraq war was seen as belated and although Japanese financial assistance was in the end considerable it earned limited goodwill. Japanese defence forces can now take part in ‘expeditionary missions’ but ‘there are still significant gaps in the relevant Japanese operational doctrine  (page 155).’

Part three begins with further discussion of the political and ‘normative’ constraints to Japan’s national security.  Japanese ships can now provide protection for Japanese vessels from Somali piracy, but Japanese rules of engagement remain more restrictive than those of other countries.  Japanese defence policies have some way to go before they can be seen as those of a ‘normal’ power.

It is unfortunate that this book was put together before the implications for Japanese defence policy of the growth in Chinese naval strength, including the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, could be properly considered.   The Senkaku islands in the South China Sea which are the subject of dispute between Japan and China are not even listed in the index.

This review is written for members of the Japan Society rather than for the defence community as a whole. It does not, therefore, deal with the various discussions in this book on British defence policy and strategic objectives.